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OR I G I N A L AR T I C L E
The role of services in globalisation
Timon Bohn | Steven Brakman | Erik Dietzenbacher
Faculty of Economics and Business, University of Groningen, Groningen, The Netherlands
1 | INTRODUCTION
Empirical trade research is focused on manufactured goods despite the rapid growth of services
trade (Feenstra, 2016). To a large extent, this is caused by data restrictions on services trade. Ser-
vices are not only directly traded but also indirectly embodied in manufacturing exports (Drake-
Brockman & Stephenson, 2012). The indirect contributions of (domestic) services inputs in
exported manufactured goods are not captured by traditional statistics such as balance of payments
statistics.1 Gross exports thereby—potentially—understate the significance of services, and also the
extent of globalisation (Johnson, 2014).
This paper focuses on the role of services and addresses the following two questions to high-
light the growing importance of services trade. First, it is often stated that the growing usage of
information and communication technologies has expanded the scope of services and enhanced
their tradability (Baldwin, 2016). Is this trend reflected in a rising importance of trade in services
relative to trade in manufactured goods over time? Second, assuming relatively low transport barri-
ers related to services, trade in services (when compared to manufacturing) could be more impor-
tant in interregional trade than in intraregional trade. The ICT revolution reduces trade barriers and
facilitates fragmentation of the production process (Baldwin, 2016). Do services, which we define
in a broad sense to include both embedded services and direct services exports, therefore travel
further than manufactured goods? These questions follow Low’s (2013) call for more analytical
research on the characteristics of services in global value chains. They also serve the goal of Bald-
win and Lopez-Gonzalez (2015) to stimulate more empirical and theoretical work on how the
internationalisation of production has altered the nature and impact of globalisation.
The analysis is primarily based on trade in value-added. The trade in value-added perspective
employs a different method than does a standard trade analysis based on gross trade. This
approach involves using input–output analysis to measure the value-added produced in one country
that ends up in the consumption bundle of another country. In the case of services trade, this cap-
tures the direct value-added of domestic services industries that is embodied in a product traded by
1Trade in services data is collected according to the Extended Balance of Payments System (EBOPS) in the International
Monetary Fund’s Balance of Payments Statistics, but the quality is lower than for goods trade; in addition, few countries
provide bilateral data or much product level detail (Ahmad, Bohn, Mulder, Vaillant, & Zaclicever, 2017).
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the same industry, the indirect value-added of domestic services industries that is embodied in
traded manufactured goods, and the indirect value-added of services industries that is embodied in
all other traded products (including agricultural products and products traded by downstream ser-
vices industries). The final demand approach is inclusive as it accounts for all sources of value-
added and does not separate out the direct from indirect value-added contributions of domestic ser-
vices industries in trade. We use two indicators to capture the significance of services both from
an upstream and a downstream viewpoint.
Previous research shows that three-quarters of all services embodied in value-added trade are
embedded services rather than directly traded (Heuser & Mattoo, 2017). To provide a complemen-
tary analysis that considers only directly traded products, we compare the value-added data to a
more conventional approach that draws upon gross exports. Gross exports provide only the value
of all products directly exported by services industries and manufacturing industries (even if there
are industries from other sectors that contribute to their respective total export values). The distinc-
tion between embedded services and directly traded services is important when the relative dis-
tances of services and manufactured goods in trade are analysed in Section 4.2. The main source
for the analyses is the World Input-Output Database (Dietzenbacher, Los, Stehrer, Timmer, & de
Vries, 2013), containing time-series data on trade linkages for 43 countries and 56 industries.
In general, we find that trade in value-added created in services increased more than trade in
value-added created in manufacturing during the period 2000–14. This holds especially for the
European Union and North America. Second, trade of value-added in services is traded over longer
distances than trade of value-added in manufacturing. That is, services had a larger share in the
interregional exports of value-added than in the intraregional exports of value-added and the oppo-
site held for manufacturing. In Europe, it was especially the value-added created in financial inter-
mediation services and business services (IT and consulting) that was more important in
interregional trade in value-added. The findings hold not only for trade in value-added indicators
(which account for the large indirect value-added created by services industries) but also when
indicators are used that capture the direct exports of services industries themselves (gross export
figures). These findings add to our knowledge of globalisation: trade is increasing worldwide, and
interregional globalisation in the sense of rising trade between countries from different regions is
related to the role of services being more truly global than the role of manufacturing.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 explains why services may be growing in impor-
tance in trade. It is explained how a value chain-based approach provides a better statistical depic-
tion of the services embodiment of trade. Section 3 describes the approach to measure services
trade and presents the methodology and data sources. Indicators are introduced to measure a coun-
try’s dependence on trade as a share of its GDP and final demand. Section 4 applies the indicators
to answer the research questions. Section 5 concludes and discusses some implications.
2 | LITERATURE
2.1 | The growing importance of services
Recent growth in world trade is closely intertwined with the emergence of global production net-
works.2 Specialisation no longer refers to sectors within countries but to specialisation in different
activities within production networks. This implies that international trade is characterised by trade
2Equivalent terms commonly used to refer to the importance of international production networks include the unbundling or
fragmentation of production, supply chain trade, trade in tasks and vertical specialisation.
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in intermediate products (Jones & Kierzkowski, 2001). The international fragmentation of produc-
tion has been helped by the ICT revolution that came on top of the sharp decline in trade barriers
since the late 1980s. Baldwin (2006, 2016) refers to this phenomenon as the “second unbundling”
and argues that it represents the transition to a new era of globalisation.3 These developments can
be illustrated from the perspective of global value chains (GVCs). A GVC encompasses all pro-
ductive (value-adding) activities across countries involved in bringing a product to the final con-
sumer. This includes initial conception (e.g., R&D), production, assembly, marketing and
distribution, final delivery and support (Gereffi & Fernandez-Stark, 2016). While the final product
in a GVC is completed in one country only and then sent to the consumer, the product contains
intermediate inputs and value-added contributions sourced from one or more countries.
The “second unbundling” is not just a technological revolution in manufacturing but also a rev-
olution in services as the use of services is pivotal in the spatial unbundling of tasks. The rise of
information and communication technologies (ICT) reduced the coordination costs of complex pro-
duction processes, enabling the global fragmentation of production. Embodied services were also
traded in antiquity (see O’Rourke & Williamson, 2002; who debate how long ago globalisation
began), but sophisticated ICT services, transport and financial services have in recent decades
helped to facilitate highly fragmented production processes that source inputs (parts and compo-
nents) from all over the world. For these reasons, services have been referred to as the “glue” link-
ing fragments within production chains together (Drake-Brockman & Stephenson, 2012; Low,
2013). So, services can be expected to play an increasingly essential role in trade.
This also has policy consequences. The National Board of Trade (2012) of Sweden, for
instance, indicates how GVCs have implications for trade policy and management of trade agree-
ments. The authors argue that trade negotiators should not focus on manufactured goods or ser-
vices in isolation but rather consider the interdependencies of the two and take the value chain
into account.4 Recent research also suggests that trade liberalisation in services, broadly defined as
opening up the domestic market for foreign services providers, can induce a comparative advan-
tage for downstream production processes that rely heavily upon services inputs. Countries that
reduce trade restrictions for services and have complementary domestic regulatory policies are
more likely to gain a comparative advantage in producing manufactured goods that depend on ser-
vices (Van der Marel, 2016). Furthermore, liberalisation in services can stimulate productivity in
manufacturing (Arnold, Javorcik, Lipscomb, & Mattoo, 2016).
Services account for 75% of GDP and 80% of employment in OECD countries (Nordas & Rouzet,
2015). However, the role of services in cross-border trade and production networks remains less
understood. This is mainly caused by a lack of reliable data at the aggregate level and conceptual dif-
ficulties as to how to define a service and what the balance of payments measure (Broussolle, 2014,
2015). The rise of GVCs adds to this statistical challenge. Take for example, a Boeing 787 aircraft
composed of parts and components produced in 5,000 factories worldwide before being assembled in
the US (Kelly, 2012). The production of each component in turn requires subcomponents sourced
from even more countries. In the current accounting system based on gross exports, these intermedi-
ates are counted each time they cross the border, including when embodied in downstream goods and
services. This raises issues related to multiple-counting.
3Globalisation’s “first unbundling” began in the 1820s with the spatial separation of production and consumption. One
prominent study calls this first unbundling, fueled by the transport revolution, the “big bang” of globalisation (O’Rourke &
Williamson, 2002).
4This discussion refers indirectly to the effective rate of protection (Bhagwati, Panagariya, & Srinivasan, 1998). This con-
cept of protection explicitly includes supply chain effects.
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The current accounting system retains legitimacy as long as countries exist because actual trade
is still bilateral and these are the transactions that are registered by customs officials. However,
relying solely on gross exports may lead to misleading interpretations when they are used by poli-
cymakers to assess trade competitiveness because sophisticated inputs may have been imported.
The Boeing 787’s final assembler, for example, contributes considerably less to the plane’s produc-
tion value than what is suggested by the plane’s final export price. A GVC perspective can iden-
tify the largest value creators and also identify the final consumers in the end-market, whose
demand triggers value-added production in other countries through their consumption of final
goods and services. For these reasons, both the standard and GVC views have their legitimacy and
contribute in complementary ways to the analysis of trade.
2.2 | Two questions
Manufacturing industries that are involved in trade—especially those involved in the production of
elaborately transformed and high-value-added goods—depend on domestic services (Drake-Brock-
man & Stephenson, 2012). This implies that there are more services being traded than what is sug-
gested by gross export statistics. Gross export statistics report the directly traded services, such as
communications services, but not the domestic services that are embodied in the export of manu-
factured goods, commodities or even other services (which are hence traded indirectly). Therefore,
focusing on the trade of value-added in service industries has two advantages. First, value-added
trade has a higher correlation with domestic non-tradable services that are used as inputs than gross
exports trade data. The latter only reflects the total value of the traded product and does not sepa-
rate out the domestic non-tradable services component that contributes to its final value, such as
embedded software in aircraft. Second, inputs passing through multiple countries within production
networks are not double counted.
Whenever we refer to exports (or imports) of value-added, for example, the trade of value-
added in services industries, we refer to the domestic value-added generated by the industries of
this sector (i.e., services) that is consumed abroad (respectively imported and consumed domesti-
cally). In this way, there can be trade in value-added between two countries even if there is no
bilateral trading relationship because the value-added may be delivered to final consumers via a
third country. The final demand approach provides the location where the value-added is ultimately
consumed, home or abroad, but does not decompose gross exports. Thus, while all value-added
contributions of services industries to trade are accounted for, this inclusive approach does not dis-
tinguish between the trade of value-added in services that is embodied in products traded by manu-
facturing industries, traded by the same or different services industries or traded by other sectors
(e.g., agricultural production). Similarly, the trade of value-added in manufacturing is considered
to be all domestic value-added created in manufacturing industries—even if the value-added is
embodied in a traded service—that ends up in the foreign consumption of final products. The
industries included in the manufacturing sector, services sector and other production sector are pro-
vided in Appendix Table S1 in the online Supplementary Material. A more detailed explanation of
the method and computations are provided in Section 3 on analytical framework.
The first question considers the increased tradability and importance of services over time,
which Saez, Taglioni, van der Marel, and Zavacka (2014, p. 2) refer to as “one of the most impor-
tant changes in trade patterns over the last quarter of the 20th century.” Value-added trade of ser-
vices industries is growing relative to value-added trade of manufactured goods industries. The
growth of services in value-added trade is documented in previous studies (Heuser & Mattoo,
2017; Miroudot & Cadestin, 2017). For example, Heuser and Mattoo (2017) show that the share
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of services in world value-added exports increased from about 30% to more than 40% since 1980.
Our approach differs in that we use a final demand perspective and decompose the trade in value-
added and gross exports on a regional basis (Europe, North America and East Asia). This could
demonstrate how patterns in different regions may differ and whether the overall growth in ser-
vices is a truly global phenomenon. Therefore, we ask the following question:
Question 1: Has trade of value-added in services industries become more important
relative to trade of value-added in manufactured goods industries between 2000 and
2014?
Next, we will focus on the distance traversed from the point of value creation to the point of con-
sumption. In other words, does the value-added contributed by services or by manufacturing indus-
tries travel “further”? A clear difference in their average distances (in connection to the answer to the
first question) may contribute to our understanding of the spatial reach of trade; the ICT revolution
could have facilitated services trade of longer distances. Here too, value-added trade refers to both
direct cross-border services trade and services embodied, for example, in the trade of manufactured
goods. Due to data limitations on services, no existing study has looked into this issue.
Direct (non-embedded) services exports are by themselves not subject to transportation costs
and this should in theory facilitate their trade over large distances. But also embedded services
may traverse a longer distance because they add value to the exports of manufactured goods. Cus-
tomised and elaborated products that embody more services (such as software) might reduce the
impact of distance by decreasing relative transport costs. Even manufactured goods that do not
embody many services, but which travel a longer distance will increase the role of services for the
simple fact that transport costs are themselves considered a service.
On the other hand, recent studies have shown that trade costs for direct services trade are sev-
eral times higher than for goods (Anderson, Milot, & Yotov, 2014; Miroudot, Sauvage, & Shep-
herd, 2013). Significant regulatory burdens, non-tariff barriers and trade restrictions for services
persist and these are magnified as barriers for trade in goods decline. Impediments to services trade
are highlighted by the OECD’s Services Trade Restrictiveness Index. One could argue that regula-
tory burdens are greater across larger distances if the well-known liability of foreignness equally
applies to trade in direct services. Restrictions on direct services trade also have an effect on
embedded services because exported goods may depend on services inputs that need to be
imported. This would suggest that value-added created by service industries may not travel further
than value-added created by manufacturing industries.
Another factor that could play a role is that countries belonging to regional agreements may
have a higher level of regulatory convergence in services. This suggests they may trade more
direct services and also more embedded services because it would be easier to import foreign ser-
vices inputs. Deeper agreements that also provide provisions for services are more common
amongst geographically proximate countries (e.g., the EU), and hence, this could lead to a stronger
regional nature of services trade. However, deeper regional agreements that promote regulatory
convergence in services would likely also have provisions that stimulate the trade of manufactured
goods. Thus, it is not clear whether the trade facilitating effect of regulatory convergence would be
stronger on the services sector or on the manufacturing sector.
Question 2: Does trade of value-added in services industries travel further than trade
of value-added in manufactured goods industries?
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3 | ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK AND DATA SOURCES
To investigate the two research questions, we use world input–output tables (WIOTs). WIOTs
illustrate flows (i.e., sales and purchases) of industry outputs (final and intermediate) within an
economy.5 WIOTs enable researchers to trace interdependencies in global production and the
division of income in trade between industries, countries and regions. Value-added refers to the
“difference between the value of output minus the sum of required intermediate inputs of
goods and services” (Escaith, 2014a, p. 1). This is equivalent to total compensation for labour
and capital.
There are two main approaches to measure value-added trade. The demand-side absorption
approach (or “trade in value-added”) computes how much value-added that is created in industry i
in country r is contained in the demand for final products by country s (Johnson & Noguera,
2012). Final demand consists of the categories household consumption, government expenditures
and investments. Note that it is possible that country s does not import from country r, whereas
s’s consumption bundle still embodies much value-added generated in r. In that case, there is no
dependence in gross trade between r and s, whereas dependence in terms of trade in value-added
does exist. Hence, even country pairs that have no gross bilateral trade may still be mutually
dependent via third countries.
By comparison, the supply-based approach (or “value-added in trade”) estimates country r’s
value-added embodied in its bilateral or total gross exports (Koopman, Wang, & Wei, 2014). The
domestic value-added in gross exports is decomposed into three parts. First is direct domestic
value-added created by the exporting industry in country r. Second is indirect domestic value-
added through the exporting industry’s use of inputs from domestic upstream industries. Third is
re-imported domestic value-added. This is relevant in certain outsourcing arrangements such as cir-
cular trade. Semi-finished products may be shipped from the United States to Mexico for assembly
before returning to the US for re-export. This method separates foreign value-added embodied in a
country’s exports from domestic value-added—also solving double-counting. Both demand-side
and supply-side approaches are consistent in that they lead to similar total trade figures on the glo-
bal level (Escaith, 2014b). A country’s total trade surplus or deficit will be the same using either
method, but bilateral trade balances between countries may differ.
This study applies the demand-side absorption approach which essentially answers the ques-
tion “who generates how much value-added for whom?”. The answer can be viewed from two
different perspectives. These are the seller’s or downstream viewpoint (which traces where the
value-added goes to) and the buyer’s or upstream viewpoint (which traces where the value-
added—that composes all final demand—comes from). We employ measures that consider both
upstream and downstream value-added based dependencies, formalising the concepts introduced
by Johnson and Noguera (2012). Our starting-point is the WIOT in Table 1 with m countries,
each with n industries.
The mn 9 mn matrix D of intermediate deliveries,6 the mn 9 m matrix F of final demands, the
mn-element output vector z, and the mn-element value-added vector v are (in partitioned form)
given by
5This follows the OECD’s definition: http://www.oecd.org/trade/input-outputtables.htm.
6Matrices are in bold capital letters (e.g., D or Drs), vectors are in bold lower case letters (e.g., z or zr), and scalars are in
italicized letters (e.g., n, zri , or d
rs
ij ). A circumflex (or “hat”) is used to indicate a diagonal matrix (e.g., z^ or z^r) and an apos-
trophe (or “dash”) for transposition (e.g., z’ or zrð Þ0).
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Element drsij of the n 9 n matrix D
rs gives the money value (say in million dollars, m$) of
intermediate deliveries from industry i in country r to industry j in country s, element f rsi of the n-
element vector frs gives the deliveries from industry i in country r for final demands in country s,
element zri of the n-element vector z
r gives the output of industry i in country r and element vri of
the n-element vector vr gives the value-added generated in industry i in country r. The mn 9 mn
matrix with input coefficients is given by A ¼ Dz^1, implying Ars ¼ Drs ðz^sÞ1or arsij ¼ drsij =zsj
which gives the intermediate inputs per unit of the receiving industry’s output. In the same fashion,
the value-added coefficients are given by g0 ¼ vz^1, implying ðgrÞ0 ¼ ðvrÞ0ðz^rÞ1 or gri ¼ vri =zri
which gives the value-added in industry i in country r per unit of its output.
From the WIOT in Table 1, it follows that
Pm
s¼1D
rseþPms¼1 frs ¼ zr, where e is a summation
vector (consisting of ones) of appropriate length. Using the definition of the input coefficients
(Drs ¼ Arsz^s) yields Pms¼1 Arszs þPms¼1 frs ¼ zr, or z ¼ Azþ Fe. Its solution is given by z = LFe,
where the mn 9 mn matrix L  I Að Þ1 is the Leontief inverse, which—in its partitioned form
—is given by
TABLE 1 WIOT with m countries
Intermediate deliveries Final demands
1  r  s  m 1  r  s  m Total
1 D11  D1r  D1s  D1m f11  f1r  f1s  f1m z1
⋮ ⋮ . .
.
⋮ ⋮ ⋮ ⋮ . .
.
⋮ ⋮ ⋮ ⋮
r Dr1  Drr  Drs  Drm fr1  frr  frs  frm zr
⋮ ⋮ ⋮ . .
.
⋮ ⋮ ⋮ ⋮ . .
.
⋮ ⋮ ⋮
s Ds1  Dsr  Dss  Dsm fs1  fsr  fss  fsm zs
⋮ ⋮ ⋮ ⋮ . .
.
⋮ ⋮ ⋮ ⋮ . .
.
⋮ ⋮
m Dm1  Dmr  Dms  Dmm fm1  fmr  fms  fmm zm
VA v1ð Þ0  vrð Þ0  vsð Þ0  vmð Þ0
Total z1ð Þ0  zrð Þ0  zsð Þ0  zmð Þ0
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For any final demand vector, we can calculate the outputs in each country and next how much
value-added is involved. Take the final demands in country s (i.e., fts, with t = 1, . . ., m). The pro-




Premultiplying this production in country r with the value-added coefficients gives the vectorPm
t¼1 g^
rLrtf ts. Its ith element gives the value-added generated in industry i in country r that is
embodied in the final demands in country s. The total value-added generated in country r that is
embodied in the final demands in country s then is
Pm
t¼1 g
rð Þ0Lrtf ts. If r 6¼ s, it gives the value-
added of country r that is ultimately absorbed by the final users in country s or, in other words,
the exports of value-added from r to s. For the value-added exports, we thus have
VAXrs ¼Pmt¼1 grð Þ0Lrtf ts.
We can now create an m 9 m matrix with VAXrs (including the diagonal elements with r = s).
It can be shown that its rowsums equal the GDP of the corresponding country (i.e.,Pm
s¼1 VAX
rs ¼ GDPr). Taking the downstream perspective, the answer to the question “where does




and is for final users abroad. Normalising the rows of the matrix with VAXrs gives percentages or





It expresses the share of country r’s GDP that is exported to country s and is embodied in its
final demands. The share of GDPr that is exported yields (by summing over all destination coun-
tries) XVAr ¼Ps6¼r XVArs.
In the same fashion, it can be shown that the column-sums equal the total value of final
demands of the corresponding country (i.e.,
Pm
r¼1 VAX
rs ¼Pmr¼1Pni¼1 f rsi ¼ FDs). Note that all
final demands consist of pieces of value-added that are consumed by final users. The upstream per-
spective thus asks “where does the consumed value-added in country s come from?” and the
answer is: VAXss is by the own producers,
P
r 6¼s VAX
rs is imported (and is thus generated by pro-
ducers abroad). Normalising the columns of the matrix with VAXrs gives the shares again. The





It expresses the share of country s’s total value of final demand (FD) that is imported from and
generated by country r. In other words, the value-added imports from r as a share of total final
demands in country s.
To assess whether services travel further than manufactured goods (Section 4.2), it is necessary
to distinguish between dependence on intraregional and interregional trade. In the empirical
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application we will focus on three regions: EU, which consists of all 28 members of the European
Union; North America, which consists of the three NAFTA countries Canada, Mexico and the
United States; and East Asia, which consists of China, Japan, Korea and Taiwan. These are also
the regions analysed in the two studies most closely related to this paper, Los, Timmer, and de
Vries (2015) and Baldwin and Lopez-Gonzalez (2015).
The XVA and MVA indicators are split into intraregional and interregional components. Let us
indicate a region with a capital letter. Then, the intraregional XVA for region R is obtained by
summing the value-added exports of all members of R to all other countries in R, and taken as a






rs  VAXrrð ÞP
r2R GDPr
: (3)
















rs  VAXrrð ÞP
r2R GDPr
: (5)
The split of the MVA indicator into an intraregional and an interregional component is similar.





When discussing the results, we will distinguish between the contributions of three sectors to trade




r Lrtf ts is an n-element vector and its ith element gives the value-added generated in
industry i in country r that is embodied in the final demands in country s. Denote this by VAXrsi . Then,














There is online Supplementary Material with a set of Appendix tables (Tables S2–S7) that
contain the results at industry level.
We use the 2016 release of the World Input-Output Database (WIOD) (Timmer, Dietzenbacher,
Los, Stehrer, & de Vries, 2015). This database contains annual time-series of WIOTs for the period
2000–14. The consistent and harmonised tables include detailed data for 43 countries (including all 28
EU members and the major advanced and emerging economies) and 56 industries. In this paper, ser-
vices are defined in a broad sense and include financial services; real estate; business services; transport
services; post and telecommunications; education; public administration; health and social work; and
wholesale trade and retail trade services. According to this broad definition, 29 of the 56 industries in
the database are considered services industries. These 29 industries—numbered 28–56 in Table S1 in
the online Supplementary Material—are considered part of the services sector in this analysis.7 The
7Industries numbered 5–23 in Appendix Table S1 in the online Supplementary Material are considered part of the manufac-
turing sector; and industries numbered 1–4 and 24–27 are considered part of the other production sector.
2740 | BOHN ET AL.
2016 release of the WIOD is an update of the 2013 version of the database, which covered 40 countries
and a slightly earlier timeframe. The 2016 version offers more industry-level detail than the initial
WIOD release. For example, the new version includes a disaggregation of business services. Reliable
and detailed data for business services are useful, because business services are known to play a key
role in global value chains (Berry, Bohn, &Mulder, 2016).
Services data are the weakest part of current trade databases. This is because of the intangible
characteristic of services output and the resulting challenge in capturing services trade flows. These
challenges also hold for the WIOD and certain balancing procedures and assumptions were neces-
sary for the construction of internally consistent tables. Services data in the WIOD use alternative
data sources than standard balance of payments statistics (customs information) because the data-
base builds on international supply-use tables, which are sometimes regarded as providing more
reliable data for services (Miroudot & Shepherd, 2016). For these reasons, the WIOD is regarded
as a comprehensive, reliable and consistent database.
4 | EMPIRICAL RESULTS
This section investigates evolving dependencies of the European Union, North American and East
Asian regions on trade in value-added by applying the XVA and MVA indicators. Section 4.1
examines the extent to which trade of value-added in services industries is (or is not) becoming
more important relative to trade of value-added in manufactured goods industries over time. This
involves deriving sectoral shares of both value-added based indicators. Section 4.2 considers
whether services or manufactured goods travel “further” in value-added trade. The results based on
gross exports (from the same database) serve as a benchmark.
4.1 | Identifying the relative importance of services trade over time
Table 2 reports the indicators XVA and MVA for the European Union’s, North American and East
Asian trade in value-added. The exports of value-added as a share of regional GDP were given by
Equation (6), and the imports of value-added as a share of regional final demand are obtained from
using a similar equation. The results are given for the years 2000 and 2014, and by sector. The
sectors (that account for the entire economy) are: manufacturing (M), services (S) and other pro-
duction (O), which includes agriculture, mining and quarrying, electricity and construction. The
two years are the first and last year in the database.8


















Table 2 shows that the average EU country exported 23.3% of its GDP in 2000, which rose to
27.6% in 2014, an increase of 4.3 percentage points (p.p.). That is, foreign final users (responsible
for household consumption, private investments and government expenditures) generate
8Only the results for 2000 and 2014 are displayed and the results are aggregated on a regional level to illustrate the most
important trends. However, results for individual countries within each region and for all 15 years are available upon
request.
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approximately one quarter of an EU country’s GDP. The “earnings” triggered by foreign final
demand is further split into the value-added generated in each sector. The exports of value-added
generated by services amounted for the average EU country to 11.3% of its GDP in 2000 but to
15.0% in 2014, an increase of 3.7 percentage points. The results for all 56 industries are given in
Appendix Table S2 in the online Supplementary Material. From these tables, it appears that
approximately two-thirds of the overall increase (of 4.3 p.p.) in XVA was attributable to business
services (1.8 p.p.) and wholesale/retail trade (0.9 p.p.).9 The export of value-added has remained
more or less constant for the sectors manufacturing and other production in the average EU coun-
try. Services have thus become more important over time for the generation of value-added trig-
gered by foreign final demand.
Whereas the XVAs indicate the foreign dependence on EU production, inputs and value-added,
the MVAs indicate the EU dependence on foreign value-added. Of the total final demand in the
average EU country, 22.5% was accounted for by foreign value-added in 2000, increasing to
24.6% in 2014. Observe that the dependence on manufacturing value-added declined (with 0.6
p.p.) and the largest increase was for services (with 1.6 p.p.). Also the increase in other production
was substantial (1.0 p.p.), and it turns out that this was largely due to mining and quarrying. It
TABLE 2 Trade in value-added and gross exports for three regions (European Union, North America and East
Asia) and sectors
European Union North America East Asia
M S O T M S O T M S O T
XVA
2000 10.0 11.3 2.1 23.3 3.7 4.3 0.9 9.0 7.4 5.0 1.0 13.3
2014 10.2 15.0 2.4 27.6 3.6 5.5 1.8 10.8 9.6 7.1 2.3 19.0
Change 0.2 3.7 0.4 4.3 0.2 1.2 0.9 1.9 2.2 2.2 1.2 5.7
MVA
2000 9.3 9.9 3.3 22.5 5.1 4.1 1.8 11.1 4.3 4.0 2.4 10.8
2014 8.7 11.5 4.3 24.6 5.0 4.8 2.7 12.6 5.2 5.5 4.7 15.4
Change 0.6 1.6 1.0 2.0 0.1 0.7 0.9 1.5 0.9 1.5 2.3 4.6
XGT
2000 23.7 8.4 1.8 33.9 7.9 3.3 0.9 12.0 13.8 3.0 0.2 17.1
2014 27.2 14.0 2.3 43.5 8.0 4.5 1.7 14.1 21.5 4.2 0.3 26.1
Change 3.5 5.6 0.5 9.6 0.0 1.2 0.8 2.1 7.7 1.2 0.1 9.0
Notes: The European Union includes all 28 EU members, North America includes Canada, Mexico and the United States, and East
Asia consists of China, Japan, Korea and Taiwan. The sectors are as follows: M = manufacturing; S = services; O = other produc-
tion; and T = total/sum of all sectors. XVA refers to value-added exports as a share of GDP, averaged over the countries in the
region. MVA refers to value-added imports as a share of total final demand, averaged over the countries in the region. XGT refers
to total gross exports as a share of GDP, averaged over the countries in the region. Note that all data are rounded to the nearest
tenth.
9The following industries make up business services: “Legal and accounting activities, activities of head offices, manage-
ment and consultancy activities” (M69/M70); “Architectural and engineering activities, technical testing and analysis”
(M71); “Scientific R&D” (M72); “Advertising and market research” (M73); “Other professional, scientific and technological
activities, veterinary activities” (M74/M75); “Administrative and support service activities” (N), and “Computer program-
ming, consultancy and related activities; information service activities” (J62/63). See Appendix Table S1 in the online Sup-
plementary Material for the classification of all services industries.
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was the industry responsible for the single largest percentage point increase in dependence (0.6
p.p.). This reflects a greater reliance of EU’s final demands on natural resource imports. The grow-
ing importance of the other production sector (and of the mining and quarrying industry in particu-
lar) might be partly explained by higher commodity prices and not only by volume changes.
Returning to Question 1 (“Has trade of value-added in services industries become more impor-
tant relative to trade of value-added in manufactured goods industries between 2000 and 2014?”),
the answer is clearly affirmative for the European Union. The rising contributions of services
industries to trade in value-added could be a reflection of the growing importance of services over-
all in the EU and other developed regions. This development may systematically boost the trade
triggered by services industries. Another explanation may be the liberalisation of services trade
during the time period, such as via services trade negotiations, which have led to the rise of ser-
vices-related GVCs (Heuser & Mattoo, 2017).
The bottom part of Table 2 gives the results for the gross export figures. These data have the
advantage of providing the industry of the products actually crossing the border (both intermediates
and final). The products exported by these industries may contain value-added created in other
industries or sectors, but only the industry of the actually exported products is reflected in the data.
Let prs ¼Ps6¼r DrseþPs6¼r frs indicate the vector of gross exports from country r to country s,












gives, for the average EU country, its gross exports as a share of its GDP. Observe in Table 2 that
the role of manufacturing is much more important than the role of services when exports are mea-
sured directly (as is the case with XGT). The role of services is to a large extent indirect. Still, also
when using the direct export figures it is true that exports in services have become more important
relative to exports in manufactured goods.
For North America, the findings are similar but not as pronounced as for the EU. The trade in
value-added has grown more for value-added created in the services sector than in manufacturing
(which has even fallen). The same applies to the services trade itself (see XGT). However, the
changes were not very large. For instance, total exports of value-added nudged up from 9.0% to
10.8% as a share of GDP between 2000 and 2014. Furthermore, the sector other production (agri-
culture, mining and quarrying, construction, and electricity) contributed almost equally to this
change. This is almost exclusively due to mining and quarrying, which was the single industry that
had the greatest impact on the increases in trade in value-added. Rising commodity prices in the
mining and quarrying industry may play a role, which reinforces the decision to focus the compar-
ison on the services and manufacturing sectors. Both the XVA and the MVA of mining and quar-
rying grew by +0.7 p.p. over the time period. In explaining the increased importance of services,
business services and wholesale trade were particularly influential, just as they were for the EU.
In East Asia, exports of value-added are still dominated by manufacturing although services
catches up. The percentage point changes in XVA were 2.2 for both sectors. Value-added abroad
triggered by final demands in the East Asian countries sketches a different picture. Imports of for-
eign value-added (MVA) increased considerably (on average with 4.6 p.p.), but the increase was
the largest for value-added created in other production and the smallest for manufacturing. The
findings with regards to the XVA indicator are in line with the idea of Factory East Asia. The
region is still dependent for its value-added creation on exporting manufactured goods, although
the indirect contribution of services grows steadily.
Business services played a relative large role in explaining rising dependencies of the three
regions on trade. On the import side, this may be related to the increased domestic offshoring of
business services activities in developed countries to emerging and developing countries. Balance
of payments data provides some information on disaggregated trade flows in the business services
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industries, which corroborates what we find using WIOD. For example, the United States and Ger-
many outsourced especially in the computer services, business consulting, advertising and market
research, R&D, and legal services sectors (Berry et al., 2016). Emerging and developing countries
have increased their world export share in these business services categories between 2002 and
2012. At the same time, however, business services exports by developed countries have also
increased in importance. This indicates that countries may be increasingly specialising in different
types of business services.
Finally, two remarks are relevant. First, the results highlight the increasing disparities between
indicators for trade in value-added and for gross exports. In Table 2, the XVA outcomes for ser-
vices are always larger than the XGT outcomes. For manufacturing, the differences are in the
opposite direction and larger than for services. Indicators largely based on direct trade (like XGT)
overestimate manufactured goods (which embody more services) compared to indicators that fully
account for indirect trade (like XVA).
Second, almost all indicators are the largest for the EU and the smallest for North America.
One should be careful to give too much weight to this observation, as it depends on the number of
countries that are included in a region.
4.2 | Did services travel further than manufactured goods?
This section addresses the question whether trade of value-added in services industries travelled
further than trade of value-added in manufactured goods industries in 2014. This is measured by
the share of services vis-a-vis manufacturing in intraregional and interregional trade in value-
added. The intraregional XVA (INXVAR) was defined in Equation (3). Just like the XVAR in (5)
was split into XVAR ¼ XVARManuf þ XVARServices þ XVAROther , we now have
INXVAR ¼ INXVARManuf þ INXVARServices þ INXVAROther. The results in Table 3 then report the shares,
that is, INXVARServices=INXVA
R for example. Of the total value-added (created in the average EU
country) that was embodied in the final demands of all other EU countries, 50.6% was created in
the services sector and 39.2% in the manufacturing sector. Similar calculations and interpretations
apply to interregional trade in value-added. For example, 57.1% of the value-added in the average
EU country that was embodied in final demands outside the EU was created in the services sector.
The services sector in the EU thus had a larger share in the interregional exports of value-added
than in the intraregional exports of value-added (i.e., IR > IN) and the opposite held for the manu-
facturing sector (IR < IN). We conclude that exports of value-added in EU services industries trav-
elled further than exports of value-added in EU manufacturing industries. It should be noted that
this is a de facto, aggregated result because the findings may vary depending on the geographic
and structural orientation of countries in trade.
The row TOT gives the shares of the sectors in XVAR. For example, for the services sector, we
have XVARServices=XVA
R ¼ 15:0=27:6 ¼ 0:542, where the 15.0 and 27.6 are from Table 2. The
results are only for 1 year (2014) because the outcomes for other years sketch a similar picture.10
The observation for the EU’s exports of value-added (i.e., services travelled further than manu-
factured goods) also holds for the exports of value-added of the other two regions. For the imports
of value-added (MVA), the story is slightly different in the case of the EU even if the conclusions
are the same. Both for the services and the manufacturing sector, the share of interregional trade is
smaller than the share of intraregional trade (IR < IN). This is due to the role of the sector other
10The results for 2014 for the full 56-industry classification are provided in Appendix Tables S5–S7 in the online Supple-
mentary Material.
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production. Comparing IR with IN, we find IR/IN = 43.2/50.6 = 0.85 for services and IR/
IN = 31.4/39.2 = 0.80 for manufacturing. Also for imports of value-added by the EU, it is thus
true that services value-added travelled further than manufacturing value-added. For North America
and East Asia, the findings for the imports (through MVA) are similar to the findings for exports
of value-added (through XVA).11 Hence, for every region and indicator (including the EU MVA
indicator), the result held that trade in value-added created by services industries travelled further
than trade in value-added created by manufacturing industries. We add that transport services,
which could be expected to increase the share of services in interregional trade, only explain a
small share of the more global nature of services. The four transport industries together (land,
water and air transport, and support activities) accounted for less than a quarter of the increased
importance of services in the EU’s interregional exports of value-added relative to intraregional
exports of value-added. The 2000 figures (not shown in the table) reveal similar patterns.
The distributions of the intraregional and interregional shares of the sectors in XVA and MVA
appear to be time invariant. The only observable difference over time was that services grew as a
share of total trade. One possible explanation for the lack of a stronger interregional pattern over
time for services could be that the ICT revolution increased more generally the services content of
manufactured goods. Given that the majority of exports of value-added created in services indus-
tries are embodied in products traded by other sectors (e.g., in manufacturing), there is less reason
to believe an interregional trend in services would predominate relative to manufactured goods
TABLE 3 Shares for sectors in total, intraregional and interregional trade in value-added for three regions in
2014
European Union North America East Asia
M S O T M S O T M S O T
XVA
IN 39.2 50.6 10.2 100 42.3 32.4 25.3 100 58.9 30.6 10.4 100
IR 35.4 57.1 7.6 100 28.5 59.1 12.4 100 48.9 39.0 12.1 100
TOT 37.0 54.2 8.7 100 32.8 50.7 16.5 100 50.6 37.6 11.8 100
MVA
IN 39.2 50.6 10.2 100 42.3 32.4 25.3 100 58.9 30.6 10.4 100
IR 31.4 43.2 25.4 100 39.1 40.8 20.1 100 27.6 36.8 35.6 100
TOT 35.4 47.0 17.6 100 40.0 38.6 21.5 100 34.0 35.7 30.3 100
XGT
IN 66.8 26.6 6.5 100 74.4 7.7 17.9 100 94.0 5.2 0.8 100
IR 57.5 38.5 4.0 100 45.0 47.2 7.9 100 79.3 19.2 1.4 100
TOT 62.5 32.1 5.4 100 56.4 31.8 11.8 100 82.5 16.2 1.3 100
Notes: Calculations are based on the world input–output database. The European Union includes all 28 EU members, North Amer-
ica includes Canada, Mexico and the United States, and East Asia consists of China, Japan, Korea and Taiwan. Shares are rounded
to the nearest tenth. XVA refers to VA exports of a particular sector (M = manufacturing; S = services; O = other production) as a
share of all VA exports contributions (T = total/sum of all sectors = 100). MVA refers to VA imports as share of all VA import
contributions. XGT refers to regional gross exports as a share of regional GDP. IN = intraregional trade in value-added (or gross
exports), IR = interregional trade in value-added (or gross exports), TOT = total trade in value-added (or gross exports).
11Note that intraregional imports of value-added (MVA) by definition sum up to the intraregional exports of value-added
(XVA) for each region. Hence, INXVA and INMVA values are identical in Table 3.
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over time. This is because changes in the geographic orientation of manufactured goods trade
would trigger (corresponding) changes in the geographic orientation of services trade. Another
explanation could be that the effect of an expanded geographic scope of production fragmentation
on services might have been offset by regulatory convergence in services if convergence has been
the strongest within regions.
Observe that the sector other production plays a substantial role in the case of imports of value-
added (MVA). The industry-level results (see Appendix Tables S5–S7 in the online Supplementary
Material) reveal that this was overwhelmingly due to mining and quarrying, for which interregional
imports of value-added embodied in final demand were much more important than intraregional
imports (except for North America). This shows that Europe and East Asia were relatively depen-
dent on raw materials imported from outside the own region.
The sectoral embodiments of gross exports (intraregional, interregional and total) of the three
regions were also calculated for total gross exports (XGT). The trade of value-added in services is
typically indirect, because services are embodied in the gross exports of manufactured goods (Heu-
ser & Mattoo, 2017). The XVA and MVA indicators capture both the direct and indirect services
linkages. Direct export figures using the XGT approach may provide additional insights because
these data only report services and manufactured goods that cross the border, aggregated by sector,
and are not embodied indirectly in products traded by other sectors. Two conclusions can be drawn
when comparing the results for XGT with those for XVA. First, gross exports were dominated by
manufacturing. Services were considerably more important in value-added terms relative to gross
exports in each of the regions. Second, also for gross exports it was the case that services travelled
further than manufacturing.
Observe that there are significant differences in the intraregional vs. interregional shares of ser-
vices. The services share in intraregional exports of value-added was between two and six times
higher than the services share in gross intraregional exports in each region. However, discrepancies
between the share of services in interregional value-added exports and gross interregional exports
were considerably less. This provides an additional motivation for an analysis of services trade
based on value-added. The role of services is already understated when gross exports are consid-
ered, but it is even more underrepresented when gross intraregional exports are employed.
5 | CONCLUSION AND DISCUSSION
This study employed several trade indicators and different levels of industry aggregation to study
the role of services in globalisation patterns. This was done by examining the cases of the Euro-
pean Union, North America and East Asia between 2000 and 2014, and distinguishing between
intraregional, interregional and total trade. There are two key findings. First, in Europe and
North America trade of value-added in services industries rose more than trade of value-added
in manufactured goods industries. In relative terms, this was also the case in East Asia. Second,
by comparing intraregional and interregional trade in value-added on a sectoral level,
value-added created in services industries always travelled further than value-added created in
manufacturing industries.
Our results also underscored the increasing disparity between gross exports and exports of
value-added over time (supporting the original finding of Johnson & Noguera, 2012), which is
especially acute for services. This greater discrepancy for services reflects the fact that gross trade
only captures direct but not indirect services exports—understating their importance. That could
cause one to misinterpret where value is created. Disparities between the services share in gross
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exports and the services share in value-added exports were considerably larger within regions than
between regions. The results also indicated that world trade is more global when measured in
value-added terms than in gross exports. Although analysing trade in value-added is extremely use-
ful in exposing indirect dependencies, actual trade is the action that takes place. Thus, gross export
statistics remain important themselves and are also necessary to determine the trade in value-added
figures.
The importance of services is even greater in interregional trade than in intraregional trade. This
has policy implications. First, trade policy should explicitly be aimed at lifting services barriers
(Berry et al., 2016; Saez et al., 2014). The Trade in Services Agreement (TiSA) that is currently
being negotiated by 23 members of the World Trade Organization (representing 50 countries) is a
positive step in this direction. Research based on firm-level data finds that allowing for the partici-
pation of foreign services providers improves the performance of downstream manufacturing firms
(Arnold, Javorcik, & Mattoo, 2011; Duggan, Rahardja, & Varela, 2013). Second, it is important to
improve the regulatory environment for domestic services because services are embodied in the out-
put of other sectors. Regulatory reform in the services sector can contribute in establishing compara-
tive advantage for firms relying on services inputs (Van der Marel, 2016). Improved access to
services, which may accompany trade liberalisation and domestic policy reform efforts, raises com-
petitiveness and productivity of manufacturing industries (Arnold, Mattoo, & Narciso, 2008; Arnold
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